Economic Analysis of Software Defined Networking (SDN) Under Various Network Failure Scenarios by Karakus, Murat & Durresi, Arjan
Economic Analysis of Software Defined Networking
(SDN) under Various Network Failure Scenarios
Murat Karakus Arjan Durresi
Department of Computer and Information Science Department of Computer and Information Science
Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis
Indianapolis, IN 46202 Indianapolis, IN 46202
Abstract—Failures are inevitable in an operational network.
They can happen anytime in different sizes and components of a
network. They impact the network economics regarding CAPEX
(Capital Expenditure), OPEX (Operational Expenditure), rev-
enue lost due to service provisioning cut and so on. In order
to mitigate the damages resulting from these failures, reactions
of network architectures and designs are crucial for the future
of the network. Recently, Software Defined Networking (SDN)
has got the attention of researchers from both academia and
industry as a means in order to increase network availability and
reliability due to features, such as centralized automated control
and global network view, it promises in networking. To this end,
we explore the effects of programmable network architectures,
i.e. SDN technology, and traditional network architectures, i.e.
MPLS (Multiprotocol Label Switching) technology, on network
economics by exploiting Number of Satisfied Service Requests
and our predefined Unit Service Cost Scalability metrics under
network failure scenarios: i) a random single data plane link
failure and ii) a random controller (i.e. control plane) failure. To
the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to consider a
comparison of a programmable network architecture, i.e. SDN,
along with different control plane models, Centralized (Single)
Control Plane (CCP), Distributed (Flat) Control Plane (DCP),
and Hierarchical Control Plane (HCP), and a non-programmable
network architecture, i.e. MPLS, regarding network economics
in case of network failures.
Index Terms—SDN, Economics, Failure, Cost, CAPEX, OPEX
I. INTRODUCTION
Availability in networks is one of the crucial attributes for
the future of a network. When a failure happens in a network,
it is important that service disruption for customers of the
network are minimal because customers and the services are
sources for the revenue/economics of the network. Therefore,
detection of and recovery from a failure as quickly as pos-
sible has importance to mitigate the service and performance
degradation in networks.
Failures are prevalent events that can occur independent of
damage size, hardware, software, and so on in any network.
Regardless of network type, size, and services, they can
adversely affect the productivity, management, and service
provisioning in a network. These damaging events, in turn, can
result in an impact in CAPEX (Capital Expenditure), OPEX
(Operational Expenditure), and revenue of a network. As a
result, they can have a major financial impacts on service
providers. According to [1], an hourly cost of downtime for
computer networks is USD 42,000. A company, for example,
suffering from an average downtime of 100 hours a year can
lose more than $4 million per year. Also, the study in [2] states
that cloud networks from 38 cloud providers amass losses
estimated at USD 273 million and 1,600 hours of disruptions
due to application and infrastructure failures.
Impacts of failures can be different depending on the ar-
chitecture, programmable, e.g. Software Defined Networking
(SDN) or traditional, e.g. MPLS (Multiprotocol Label Switch-
ing), as well as topology used in networks. In order to mitigate
the damages resulting from these failures, reactions of network
architectures and designs are crucial for the future of the
network. Recently, SDN has got the attention of researchers
from both academia and industry as a means in order to
increase network availability, reliability, and revenue and as
well as decrease network costs, thereby service costs, due
to features, such as centralized automated control and global
network view, it promises in networking.
In this paper, we investigate how programmable network
architectures, i.e., SDN technology, affect the network eco-
nomics compared to traditional network architectures, i.e.,
MPLS technology, in case of failures. Also, we explore the
economic impact of failures in different SDN control plane
models: Centralized (Single) Control Plane (CCP), Distributed
(Flat) Control Plane (DCP), and Hierarchical Control Plane
(HCP). We exploit our predefined metric called Unit Service
Cost Scalability to evaluate economic performances of SDN
architecture along with aforementioned control plane models
and MPLS architecture under different failure scenarios. We
consider two different failure types: i) a random single data
plane link failure and ii) a random controller (i.e., control
plane) failure. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is
the first to consider a comparison of SDN architecture along
with different control plane models and MPLS architecture
regarding network economics under network failure scenarios.
This work also aims at being a useful primer to providing
insights regarding how network architectures and control plane
models perform concerning network economics under failures
for network owners to plan their investments accordingly.
In the rest of the paper, Section II gives a quick snapshot
of the papers that study failure detection and recovery. In
Section III, we explain our method along with experimental
details and the metric used in economic analysis of the
foregoing network architectures and control plane models in
case of certain failure scenarios. While Section IV presents
economic performances of both SDN models and MPLS
in the data plane link failure scenario, Section V discusses
economic performances of SDN models in the control plane
(i.e. controller) failure scenario. We summarize the paper with
concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Failure detection is the first step of dealing with a failure
in a network. A simple and inefficient approach is to probe
each switch on each link in the network utilizing some control
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messages such as hello messages, e.g., LLDP (Link Layer
Discovery Protocol) [3]. However, this solution suffers from
some problems such as imprecise detection of the failed device
and scalability issues. Kozat et al. [4] propose a more scalable
approach that revolves around the controller computing an
Eulerian cycle across all links under its responsibility. Xu
et al. [5] utilize Monitoring Flow Entries-based Link Failure
Detection (MLFD) instead of LLDP-based failure detection.
MLFD mechanism forms a monitoring tree path consisting
of switches, which is probed using Link Monitoring (LM)
packets. In [6], the authors propose an OpenFlow-like pipeline
design called SPIDER that provides a detection mechanism
based on switches’ periodic link probing. Bidirectional For-
warding Detection (BFD) [7] with fast failover group type of
OpenFlow is another approach exploited in failure detection.
After the detection of a failure, the network has to deal with
recovery of paths (i.e., recomputation of new paths), that are
broken down, in order to fulfill the flows that are affected by
the failure. Failure recovery has two schemes: Protection and
restoration. While protection involves a proactive behavior by
installing backup paths before a failure occurs, the forwarding
decisions are made after a failure happens in the restoration
case. In [8], the authors exploit the fast failover group type
and BFD to switch between two disjoint paths (working and
protected) before a failure occurs in the network. Ramos et
al. [9] utilize source routing to compute a secondary path for
every path and storing it in the packet header along with the
primary path. [10] introduces a framework, CORONET, which
is a system for recovery from multiple link failures in data
plane.
III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF NETWORK FAILURES
We study possible economic effects of different types of
network failures in SDN networks and MPLS. We investigate
two different failure scenarios: a random data plane link failure
and a random control plane (i.e., controller) failure. These
failure types are possible common failures in an SDN or
MPLS networks. They also provide network administrators
with insights to understand economic impact of failures in
different domains in a network.
Carrier-grade networks require sub 50 ms failure recovery
time not to cause a significant loss in service connectivity,
customers subscriptions, and network revenue. Studies have
shown that preserving such a fast recovery time is more
possible with protection schemes without involving controllers
in online decision-making process [8]. However, our goal is
not to propose a new standalone failure recovery mechanism.
We aim to economically analyze SDN architecture along with
some popular control plane models used in SDN and MPLS
architecture in case of different types of network failures
scenarios. Therefore, we keep the following points in our
mind (for all scenarios where applicable) while conducting
this study in order to economically evaluate the preceding
architectures and control plane models:
• We are not interested in or concerned with the speed
of a detection/recovery mechanism since our goal is not
to introduce a standalone network failure detection and
recovery framework, which is out of this paper’s scope.
We exploit a failure detection/recovery mechanism for
each failure scenario from the literature and use the same
framework for all control plane models to obtain the
start and finish times of failure detection/recovery while
conducting the economic analysis.
• We concern about the economic impact of the failures
in different control plane models. Therefore, using a
framework with lower detection/recovery time affects
economic values at the same ratio for all SDN models
and MPLS network.
• Also, there is usually (a possibility for) another study
introducing lower failure detection/recovery time. Thus,
there is no end to find the best framework to name and
use in a study similar to this.
Also, we exploit our previously proposed metric, Unit
Service Cost Scalability, to evaluate economic performances
of corresponding SDN control plane models and MPLS in
the analysis. We present the metric shortly for readers in
Subsection III-A For more details; we refer the readers to
the study presented in [11].
A. Unit Service Cost Scalability Metric
One of the challenging questions about scalability is that
whether the cost of the system to provide a service has any im-
pact on scalability of the system. Jogalekar and Woodside [12]
present that increased resource capacity in a system should
be in proportion to the cost of the system while maintaining
the quality of service. Also, in [13], Total Cost of Ownership
(TCO) is stated as one of attributes that need to be considered
while discussing network scalability. In addition, [14] proposes
a scalability metric, called “P-Scalability”, taking into account
the cost of the system in distributed systems.
In this context, we define a metric called Unit Service
Cost Scalability to evaluate unit service cost performance
of a network for service requests. It considers the network
workload and costs incurred to maintain the QoS at the same
level for all service requests in the network.
We characterize the unit cost for a service (request) from
a service tier as a function of network CAPEX, OPEX,
and Workload over a certain time period. We refer Work-
load to service requests of all service tiers coming from
users/customers to and satisfied by the network. The general
unit cost framework for a service (request) with one QoS
parameter (bandwidth) from a service tier is shown in Eq.
1. This formula implies that the unit service cost for a request
from certain service tier is the ratio of TCO (CAPEX + OPEX)
over workload in a given period.
Cbwj = f(C,O,W ) =

C+O∑
j=1 wj ·|bwj |
· |bwj | before δ
C+Cδ+O+Oδ∑
j=1 (wj+wδj )·|bwj |
· |bwj | after δ
(1)
where bwj , |bwj |, Cbwj , C, O represent the type of (i.e.
bandwidth) service with tier j, the numerical value of the
service tier bwj , the unit cost of the service bwj , CAPEX, and
OPEX in a time period (e.g. month, year), respectively. wj and
wδj represent the workload and possible additional workload
of service bwj and W =
∑
j=1 wj and Wδ =
∑
j=1 wδj .
Cδ , Oδ , and Wδ represent possible extra CAPEX, OPEX,
and workload, respectively, incurred after introducing different
kinds of changes/upgrades (represented as δ) in the network.
B. Experimental Setup
We have considered CCP, DCP, and HCP (shown in Fig. 1)


















(c) Hierarchical Controller Design (HCP)
Fig. 1: A representational overview of popular SDN control plane models. The two-sided solid, dashed, and dashed-dotted
arrows represent two-way data path among network devices, control path between controller and data plane devices, and
controller-to-controller path among controllers, respectively. In 1a (CCP), there is one main controller with global network
state. In 1b (DCP), each controller manages a sub-network/domain of the whole network and has its own local network view,
which is, in turn, abstracted as a logical node to its neighboring controllers. In 1c (HCP), there are layers where local controllers
with local view reside and are responsible for different sites (sub-domains) and a Root controller on top with global network
view is responsible for global applications like routing. We note that the data plane and control plane topologies shown in this
figure are just representative purposes.
ing analysis to evaluate their impact on network economics in
failure scenarios.
We have used Mininet emulator with POX controller in
SDN models. While there is one controller in CCP model, we
have divided the whole network into 4 fully-connected sub-
networks with a primary controller for each in control planes
of DCP and HCP models and provided 16 switches and 24
links in data planes of all SDN models and MPLS. The data
plane topology is the same in all SDN models and MPLS
cases. There is also a Root controller on top of local domain
controllers in HCP model. Regarding MPLS setting, we have
used ns3 network simulator. We needed to use a signaling
protocol such as RSVP-TE (Resource Reservation Protocol-
Traffic Engineering) and/or CR-LDP (Constraint-based Label
Distribution Protocol) to support constraint-based routing in
MPLS. Since none of them has been implemented in ns3 at the
time of this writing and it is time-consuming and effort-greedy
to implement them in ns3, we have generated extra packets
between network elements to mimic link state advertisements
and state refresh messages for LSPs from aforementioned
signaling protocols in MPLS.
In the experiments, we have used 1 Mbps flow sending rate
for all service requests. Also, we have used a modified version
of Waxman [15] random topology generator defined by Erdos-
Renyi random graph model to randomly create the networks
while preserving connectivity degrees of nodes (i.e. switches)
as three in all models. Furthermore, we have conducted a
heuristics, i.e. A*Prune Algorithm [16], to find a feasible
path through the network. In all scenarios, in the first part
of the experiments, we have provided enough bandwidth (100
Gbps) in links so that there is no service request rejection
due to network resource limitations, while, in the second part
of the experiments, we have reduced the link bandwidth to
1 Gbps to see their performances under network resource
limitations. In the experiments, the corresponding failure type
occurs at the 2nd second in both failure scenarios. Moreover,
we have averaged 20 runs for each experiment to achieve and
exceed 95% statistical significance in all scenarios. Finally,
all experiments were performed on Ubuntu 14.04 in Oracle
VirtualBox using an Intel Core i7-5500 system with 12GB
RAM.
IV. SCENARIO 1: DATA PLANE (LINK) FAILURE
Data plane (link) failure is one of the failure types that
we have investigated in our analysis for economic analysis
of failures in different SDN control plane models and MPLS.
There exist many proposals for link failure detection/recovery
methods in a network. Some of the prevalent methods ex-
ploited for failure detection are BFD sessions, Loss of Signal
(LOS), and LLDP packets. In this scenario, we only consider
a random single link failure.
For the link failure scenarios, we have utilized the methods
proposed in [17]. This study implements two well-known
mechanisms of failure recovery, i.e., protection and restora-
tion, in OpenFlow networks. In the case of protection, the
alternative paths are reserved before the failure occurs in the
network. In the case of restoration, alternative paths are not
established until a failure occurs. The controller in restoration
must notify all the affected switches about a recovery action
immediately. For implementation of the protection scheme, the
“Group Table” concept specified for OpenFlow in its version
1.1 is used. OpenFlow introduces the fast-failover group type
in order to perform fast failover without needing to involve
the controller. Any group entry of this type consists of two
or more action buckets with a well-defined order. The status
of the bucket can be changed by the monitored port going
into the “down” state or through other mechanisms such as
BFD. In the study, BFD was used to detect the failures. Once
BFD declares the failure in the working link, the action bucket
associated with this link in the group table is made unavailable
by changing the value of the alive status. For the restoration
method, once the failure has been detected, the controller is
notified about it in order to calculate new paths for the affected
flows. The controller takes then the necessary actions such
as path recomputation for flows affected by the failure and
installation of new flow rules for newly computed paths in
the corresponding switches over the new paths.
As to the MPLS case, we have used a similar method to the
one explained above for the SDN models. In the protection
case, we have utilized a link protection approach by pre-
programming next-hop port values into the router FIB awaiting
activation, which happens in milliseconds following the failure
detection. In the restoration case, on the other hand, the head




































(a) Total number of satisfied re-
quests vs. Time - 100 Gbps link
bandwidth - Protection case


































(b) Total number of satisfied re-
quests vs. Time - 1 Gbps link band-
width - Protection case


























(c) Unit service cost vs. Time -
100 Gbps link bandwidth - Pro-
tection case




























(d) Unit service cost vs. Time - 1
Gbps link bandwidth - Protection
case



































(e) Total number of satisfied re-
quests vs. Time - 100 Gbps link
bandwidth - Restoration case


































(f) Total number of satisfied re-
quests vs. Time - 1 Gbps link
bandwidth - Restoration case



























(g) Unit service cost vs. Time
- 100 Gbps link bandwidth -
Restoration case




























(h) Unit service cost vs. Time - 1
Gbps link bandwidth - Restoration
case
Fig. 2: Total number of satisfied requests and respective unit service cost performances of networks in case of data plane (link)
failure with use of protection and restoration schemes under 100 Gbps and 1 Gbps link bandwidth cases.
end of each path for each flow on the failed links recomputes
a new path following the failure detection. Regarding the
failure detection and recovery activation, BFD sessions were
established between routers for each link in the networks.
Fig. 2 shows the total number of satisfied requests and unit
service cost performances in case of a random single data
plane link failure with use of protection (Fig. 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d)
and restoration (Fig. 2e, 2f, 2g, 2h) schemes under 100 Gbps
and 1 Gbps link bandwidth cases. We have used the protection
and restoration schemes explained earlier for link failure
detection and recovery. In 100 Gbps link bandwidth case, the
total number of satisfied requests in the network increases in
both protection (Fig. 2a) and restoration (Fig. 2e) cases for
all SDN control plane models and MPLS until the failure
happens because there are enough bandwidth to use in the
links. Once the failure happens, the number of satisfied flows
in the network shows a reduction because the flows served
over the failed link are not satisfied anymore. The reduction
is the lowest in CCP and highest in HCP (465 in CCP, 1392
in DCP, 1750 in HCP, and 1862 in MPLS) among all SDN
models and MPLS in both protection and restoration cases
owing to the total number of satisfied flows in the networks.
However, the total number of satisfied requests for all models
continue to increase immediately after the reduction because
there are enough bandwidth in the links for the upcoming
requests. On the other hand, in 1 Gbps link bandwidth case, the
number of satisfied requests in the network increase until links
become loaded in both protection (Fig. 2b) and restoration
(Fig. 2f) cases for all SDN control plane models and MPLS.
After links become loaded, it shows a steady-like behavior
until the failure. Once the failure happens, it shows the lowest
reduction in CCP while the highest is in HCP (91 in CCP,
229 in DCP, 261 in HCP, 84 in MPLS) as in the previous link
bandwidth case in both protection and restoration schemes.
The total number of satisfied requests for all models stay
steady, unlike the 100 Gbps link bandwidth case, during the
recovery phase because new flows cannot be satisfied in the
network since the links are loaded in both SDN models and
MPLS. However, the recovery phase cannot be completed in
1 Gbps link bandwidth case because the flows over the failed
link cannot be rerouted from failed link to the other links
because all links are loaded/full and cannot handle more flows.
Therefore, the number of flows do not increase again after the
failure, unlike the 100 Gbps link bandwidth case.
Regarding the unit service cost, in 100 Gbps link bandwidth
case, the results reveal that it decreases as the number of
satisfied flows increase until the failure occurs for all SDN
models and MPLS in both protection (Fig. 2c) and restoration
(Fig. 2g) cases. While the unit service cost increase ratio is
the highest in CCP (∼6.1% in CCP, ∼3.1% in DCP, ∼1.9% in
HCP, and ∼4.6% in MPLS), HCP shows the lowest increase
ratio among all models in protection and restoration schemes.
After the recovery is complete, the unit service cost starts
showing a reduction again in both protection and restoration
schemes. In 1 Gbps case, the unit service cost decreases as
the total number of satisfied requests in the network increase
until the links become loaded in both protection (Fig. 2d)
and restoration (Fig. 2h) cases. Then, it reflects a steady-like
behavior until the failure happens. The link failure results in
a sudden increase (∼5.7% in CCP, ∼2.2% in DCP, ∼1.6% in
HCP, and ∼6.5% in MPLS ) in protection and restoration
schemes in the unit service cost as in the 100 Gbps link
bandwidth case. However, the unit service cost do not show
a reduction again in either of protection and restorations





































(a) Total number of satisfied re-
quests vs. Time - 100 Gbps link
bandwidth


































(b) Total number of satisfied re-
quests vs. Time - 1 Gbps link band-
width


























(c) Unit service cost vs. Time -
100 Gbps link bandwidth


























(d) Unit service cost vs. Time - 1
Gbps link bandwidth
Fig. 3: Total number of satisfied requests and respective unit service cost performances of networks in case of controller failure
under 100 Gbps and 1 Gbps link bandwidth cases.
schemes unlike the 100 Gbps link bandwidth case since the
recovery cannot be completed due to the loaded links.
V. SCENARIO 2: CONTROL PLANE (CONTROLLER)
FAILURE
As SDN brings many advantages to networking, it also
suffers from various problems. One of the serious problems
of SDN is that the controller may be a critical point of
failure, which can result in an overall network unavailability.
Therefore, the design of a fault-tolerant control plane is a
must for a SDN-based network. There might be varying
number of reasons for failure of a controller: hardware failure
(e.g., controller server hardware), software failure/bug in the
server operating system and controller software, power outages
and so on. One basic solution for a controller failure is
use of redundant controller(s) (i.e., backup/standby controller)
in order to automatically take critical responsibilities over
network infrastructure control and data flows management
from the failed primary controller in case of a controller
failure. While this procedure is called controller failover, the
reverse of the procedure (i.e., restoring the primary controller)
is called controller failback. As of OpenFlow protocol version
1.2.0, it provides the possibility to configure one or more
backup controllers which can assume the network control
in case of failure using controller role change mechanism,
but OpenFlow does not provide any coordination mechanism
between the primary and the backup controllers. Therefore,
it is network administrators’ responsibility to provide such a
synchronization method for consistency among them to handle
controller failure and add resiliency without happening any
fatal damage to network services and customer satisfaction.
In the control plane failure case, we have utilized the
method described in [18]. In this scenario, every network
domain is managed by a single controller, and another con-
troller is used as backup for every domain controller that can
take over its role in case the primary fails. In case a failure
occurs, and to ensure a smooth transition to a new primary,
in this particular instance of a fault-tolerant architecture, the
controller store the network and application related state in a
shared data store.
Fig. 3 shows the total number of satisfied requests and
respective unit service cost performances of networks in case
of a controller failure in SDN models (CCP, DCP, and HCP)
under 100 Gbps and 1 Gbps link bandwidth cases. We also
evaluated Root controller failure case in HCP model. In 100
Gbps link bandwidth case (Fig. 3a), although the total number
of satisfied requests in the networks show an increase all the
time, a primary controller failure results in some reduction
in increase ratio of the total number of satisfied requests
in the network in DCP, HCP, HCP Root controller failure
cases. Also, since all inter-domain connection requests are
affected, this reduction is more in case of HCP Root controller
failure. In CCP model, the total number of satisfied requests
in the network stay the same once a controller failure happens
because there is only one controller. However, the total number
of satisfied requests in the network start increasing after
the backup controller takes over the network management
responsibilities. In 1 Gbps link bandwidth case (Fig. 3b),
the total number satisfied requests in the network increase
until the links become loaded and then shows a steady-like
behavior in all control plane models. In CCP model, it does
not increase in controller failure case since there is only
one domain controlled by one controller although it shows
a very little increase in DCP and HCP models because some
requests may still find enough remaining bandwidth in the
links depending on the source and destination pairs. Also,
HCP and HCP Root failure cases do not make any difference
in results because the total number of satisfied requests in the
network are the same for both failure cases. It is the same
because the network becomes loaded before the controllers
reach their requests handling capacities.
Regarding the unit service cost, it is shown that it decreases
as the number of satisfied requests are increasing in both
100 Gbps (Fig. 3c) and 1 Gbps (Fig. 3d) link bandwidth
cases. In Fig. 3c, the unit service cost stays steady in CCP
model when the controller failure occurs because the satisfied
requests number in the network do not increase while the unit
service cost shows a continuous decreasing behavior in DCP
and HCP models in that phase. In Fig. 3d, the unit service cost
decreases fast until the links become loaded and then shows
a slow reduction in all models. In both 100 and 1 Gbps link
bandwidth cases, HCP Root controller failure does not make a
noticeable difference compared to a controller failure in HCP
concerning the unit service cost.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This work was partially supported by the National Science
Foundation under Grant No.1547411 and by the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA) National Institute of Food
and Agriculture (NIFA) (Award Number 2017-67003-26057)
via an interagency partnership between USDA-NIFA and
the National Science Foundation on the research program
Innovations at the Nexus of Food, Energy and Water Systems.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have explored effects of programmable network ar-
chitectures, i.e., SDN technology, and traditional network
architectures, i.e., MPLS technology, on network economics
by exploiting Number of Satisfied Service Requests and our
predefined Unit Service Cost Scalability metrics under net-
work failure scenarios: i) a random single data plane link
failure and ii) a random controller (i.e. control plane) failure.
The experiments have revealed that the unit service cost shows
an increase in case of data link failure in all SDN models
and MPLS. While CCP model shows the highest increase
ratio, HCP shows the least increase ratio among all SDN
models and MPLS in 100 Gbps link bandwidth case. Also,
this increase ratio is the highest in MPLS case in 1 Gbps link
case. In control plane (i.e. controller) failure scenario, the unit
service cost stays steady in CCP model once the controller
failure occurs because the satisfied requests number in the
network do not increase while the unit service cost shows a
continuous decreasing behavior in DCP and HCP models in
that phase in case of 100 Gbps link bandwidth case. Also, the
unit service cost decreases fast until the links become loaded
and then shows a slow reduction in all models in case of 1
Gbps link bandwidth case. Moreover, in both 100 and 1 Gbps
link bandwidth cases, HCP Root controller failure does not
make a noticeable difference concerning the unit service cost
compared to a controller failure in HCP.
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